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This study questions the extent to which domestic conflict is influenced by national, regional, and 
international relationships. It is designed to answer specific questions relating to the effects of 
neighboring characteristics on a state’s risk of conflict and instability: what is the interaction between 
neighboring conflict and political disorder? Do democratic neighborhoods have different conflict 
trajectories than non-democratic neighborhoods and if so, where and why? Given that most poor 
countries are located in poor and conflictual neighborhoods, to what extent is there a relationship 
between poverty and political disorder in different regime neighborhoods?   Using spatial lag terms 
to specify neighboring regime characteristics and multilevel models to differentiate between 
explanatory levels, this study reiterates the importance of domestic and neighboring factors in 
promoting or diminishing the risk of instability and conflict. However, the pronounced negative 
effects of autocratic and anocratic neighborhoods are mitigated by a growing domestic GDP. This 
study also finds that democratic neighborhoods are more stable, regardless of income level.   
Research presented here is unique in its contribution regarding how regime type as a significant 
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1.0 Why Include Neighbors in the Study of Civil Conflict? 
Researchers are increasingly interested in identifying characteristics of a state’s surroundings that 
have positive or adverse effects on peace and stability. To date, a number of studies have found that 
neighboring civil wars increase a state’s risk of civil conflict (see Sambanis 2001, Gleditsch 2002 & 
2003, Hegre 2003). In addition, neighboring characteristics and relationships between states can alter 
the risk of civil conflict within a state (Gleditsch 2003, Murdoch and Sandler, 2002 Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2004). The heightened risk of civil war in some larger regions (e.g. Central Africa, West 
Africa) appears to be related to the limited abilities of weak states to control their unstable 
surroundings. This study aims to contribute to the literature explaining how spatially determined 
relationships influence domestic political processes and the risk of civil war.  
Underlying this study is the assumption that domestic political phenomena are dynamic in 
that they vary over time and space. Further, these dynamics are influenced by national, regional and 
international relationships (see Enterline, 1998). As evidence of these dynamics and international 
influences, Gleditsch (2002) finds regional political characteristics have a stronger effect on both 
international war and civil war than domestic political conditions. Gleditsch (2003) concludes that 
democratic regions have a positive effect on peace within member states while autocratic and 
anocratic regions have a positive effect on conflict within member states. However, neighboring 
(border sharing) and regional instability have varying impacts on different countries over time and 
also interact with other salient factors important to civil peace. In short, depending on the state and 
region, neighboring political attributes influence civil war risk across states differently. 
I will continue Gleditsch’s line of study by arguing that the nature of neighboring regimes 
and instability impact the prospect of civil war onset and recurrence within a state. This study is 
designed to specifically answer the following questions: what is the interaction between neighboring 
conflict and domestic conflict rates? Do democratic neighborhoods have different conflict 
trajectories than non-democratic neighborhoods and if so, where and why? Given that most poor 
countries are located in poor and conflictual neighborhoods, to what extent is there a relationship 
between poverty and conflict onset and recurrence in different regime neighborhoods?  I intend to 
answer these questions by focusing on the spatial relationships and interdependences of neighbors 
and states within regions.   
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I address these questions by first discussing the current literature on international geopolitics 
and geography as it affects civil war onset and recurrence. With an attempt to extend past 
discussions of spatial dependence in civil war onset, I cover spatial dependence between causes of 
civil war, with particular emphasis on the nature of political institutions in neighboring states. 
Specifically, states within various types of political neighborhoods (democratic, autocratic, anocratic, 
low-income, high-income) may experience different effects due to neighborhood characteristics. 
Second, I hypothesize the ways in which spatial dependence and heterogeneity influence war risk. 
Third, I describe both the data and methods employed for the multi-level analysis undertaken. 
Fourth, I discuss the patterns and relationships uncovered by the analysis, remarking on how the 
interaction between regimes, income levels and neighborhoods is integral to understanding varying 
states’ records of peace and conflict. Fifth, I conclude with a brief synopsis of how these results can 
inform conflict prevention and management strategies.   
2.0 How Do Neighbors Affect Risk Patterns of Civil Conflict and Political Disorder? 
2.1 Bad Neighborhoods and the Clustering of Conflict 
It is clear that internal conflict clusters within and across states and within and across regions. The 
extent that such clustering is a result of conflict diffusion, spatially determined relationships, or the 
clustering of similar characteristics is debated (see Gleditsch 2003 and Hegre et al. 2001). The 
positive role neighboring war plays in inciting domestic conflict is evident in both qualitative and 
quantitative work. In certain cases, neighboring wars are seen as one complete war; the Congo war 
during 1996-2002 involved several neighboring states and prompted Madeline Albright, then US 
secretary of state, to claim it as “Africa’s first world war” (New York Times, 02/06/00).    
  A growing body of work extends past clustering observations and considers the role of 
neighbors and regions in affecting domestic peace and political stability within states. There are 
several reasons why neighbors and neighborhoods may be relevant as a determinant of a state’s 
prospect for peace and stability. States typically interact more with immediate neighbors and may 
operate with similar economic, social and political institutions. Those states with conflict-prone 
characteristics may then cluster, and the resultant war risk may be independent. However, it is clear 
that neighbors and regions have an additive effect on internal and international war. The effects are 
additive in the sense that in peaceful zones, neighbors bolster traditions of peace (Gleditsch, 2002 &  
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Enterline, 1998); while neighbors in conflict prone zones contribute additional risk of war and 
instability (Raleigh, 2004 and Gleditsch, 2003).   
In examining ways in which characteristics may compound domestic war risk, scholars have 
selected different attributes deemed most problematic. Examples include: shared ethnic groups 
across borders (Woodwell, 2001; Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2002; Lake and Rothchild, 1998); 
political institutions (Sambanis, 2001, Gleditsch 2001; Collier and Hoeffler 2004); refugee flows 
(Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2004); and economic institutions (Murdoch and Sandler, 2002; Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2004).  Although the research surveyed has illuminated aspects of civil war risk previously 
unknown, certain aspects of neighborhood relations remain unclear and misspecified.  
2.2 Economic Impacts to Neighboring States  
Of particular salience to this study is how spatial ‘spillovers’ of conflict are the result of both the 
direct consequences of neighboring unrest and the indirect effects from characteristics of 
surrounding states. Studies of economic spillovers have established that civil wars in one country 
directly impact the economies of neighboring countries and beyond neighboring borders (Murdoch 
and Sandler, 2002:92). Collier and Hoeffler (2004:2) estimate that a civil war reduces the growth rate 
in surrounding countries by an average of 0.9% per annum.  Furthermore, increased rates of military 
spending also adversely affect the surrounding economies (see also Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). This 
interaction across borders increases as the intensity of the war increases (2002:106). Direct or 
indirect economic impacts are of particular importance as GDP is often found to be the most 
significant indictor of civil war risk.  Simultaneously, an unstable GDP may contribute to increased 
levels of political disorder, also disproportionately found in developing/low income states. 
2.3 Impact of a Democratic State on Democracy and Instability across Regions   
That stable and consolidated democratic institutions are generally pacific and limit the onset and 
spread of interstate war is argued by the democratic peace thesis and is often empirically confirmed 
(see. Gleditsch and Ward, 2000 and Enterline, 1998). Yet, however stable the dyadic democratic 
peace is, the debate on the internal stability of democracies is ongoing. Ellingsen and Gleditsch 
(1997) find that an inverted U shape curve describes the relationship between regime type and civil 
conflict, which subsequently demonstrates the sustainably peaceful nature of coherent democracies 
and the association between anocratic regimes and conflict. Hegre (2003) upsets the accepted view 
of democracy’s role in civil peace by exposing how democracies are stable only if embedded in  
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developed economies. He argues that is due to three factors: 1) the impact of development on 
democratic stability; 2) differences in the resources required to handle conflict in autocracies and 
democracies; and 3) increased pressure to democratize from wealthy states. The relationship 
between democracy and development is demonstrated as mutually reinforcing--the higher the 
development, the more democracy lessens the risk of civil conflict; the more democratic a country, 
the more development reduces the risk of civil war (2003:232). 
The relationship between democracy and civil war is considerably more complex than the 
positive relationship between peace (internal and regional) and democracy for interstate war 
(Gleditsch, 2002).  Higher levels of domestic and regional democratization are associated with more 
peace, but instability in democracies is associated with higher levels of conflict such that it may 
counteract the benefits of democratization (2002: 109). Furthermore, and directly applicable to this 
project, Gleditsch finds that “democratizing states located among relatively democratic neighbors 
have significantly lower risks of experiencing civil war than do countries located in a zone of more 
autocratic and less constrained polities (2002: 109).”   
Political consequences from neighboring states are therefore considerable.  As Sambanis 
(2001) observes, stable democratic institutions are more important in ethnically charged societies or 
ethnically divided societies over states in which political opportunities and access to power are not 
framed in ethnic terms.  He further posits that ‘bad neighborhoods’- those defined by an absence of 
democracy- will have weak political institutions which “can only exacerbate political and economic 
grievances in other countries as a result of the uncontrolled domestic ethnic antagonisms” 
(2001:268). Sambanis concludes that neighborhood democracy competes with internal political 
structures for influence on peace (2001:275). This is in line with Gleditsch’s (2002) discussion 
concerning the equal importance of external characteristics in civil war risk assessment.  
2.4 Stability of Regime Types 
The rate and nature of regime diffusion indirectly influences the risk of war within states. Cederman 
and Gleditsch (2004) contend that evolutionary mechanisms of natural selection and adaptation can 
explain the increase and diffusion of democracy and peace. Democratic regions are built on the local 
diffusion of democracies, which in turn produce the diffusion of the democratic peace, even with 
few regimes.  Further, despite the adverse environment there might exist for lone democracies in a 
region, the “geographic clustering due to adaptive regime change can make it easier for democratic  
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states to survive in a hostile, non-democratic environment” (2004: 604). The role of regime type in 
the creation of zones of peace notwithstanding, the clustering and diffusion of regime types is 
increasingly accepted. Both democratic and autocratic regimes have been shown to diffuse and 
cluster over time– regional change and regional regime characterization is pronounced. O’Loughlin 
et al state “geographic distance does not have much effect on the overall distribution of democracy 
scores, with the values of polities strongly correlating with the values of all neighboring states in the 
region” (1998: 563).  Starr’s (1991) study tests whether regime diffusion would match pronounced 
interstate war diffusion patterns. His finding that “in the study of war, we found significant neighbor 
effects, whereby the activities of bordering states had contagious effects (both emulative and 
infectious)” (1991: 362) is in line with his finding that state regime types were affected by 
neighboring, regional and global influences.   
It should be noted that a number of authors have found no relationship between specific 
regime types and increased levels of conflict or peace (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 
2002; Benson and Kugler 1998). This is perhaps due to data differences rather than theoretical 
differences, as it is evident that fully democratic and autocratic states and regions are more peaceful, 
whereas unstable and anocratic areas are clearly not.  
Instability within states refers to the upset of political and governing systems, either toward a 
more democratic, autocratic or anocratic system. Political instability is a generally accepted indicator 
and instigator of civil unrest. That such volatility creates a more fertile climate for civil conflict is an 
established empirical conclusion. Mansfield and Snyder (2002) find that a transition from an 
autocratic regime to a partially democratic (anocratic) one is associated with a heightened war risk. 
Moreover, the transition toward democracy is “significantly more likely to generate hostility than the 
transition toward autocracy” (2002:298). Hegre et al. (2001) question whether the finding that 
anocratic regimes are positively related to conflict is, in fact, distinct from instability. Their 
proposition that both anocratic regimes and instability increase the risk of civil conflict in distinct 
and separate ways is upheld. Further, anocracies are still conflict prone when accounting for 
instability.  
Whether unstable regimes and anocracies cluster has not been analyzed. From Hegre (2003) 
we recognize that both are distinct manifestations of political disorder and both are positively 
associated with conflict onset. Yet, it is unclear whether neighboring instability and/or neighboring  
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anocracy specifically influence a state’s risk of either civil war onset or political disorder. If spatially 
dependent relationships exist, neighboring regime characteristics should possess greater influence 
than states some distance away and equal to that of domestic considerations, as had been shown for 
other neighboring political attributes on civil war. 
2.5 Does the Risk of Conflict Recurrence vary across Regime Neighborhoods? 
A risk profile of civil war prone states based on internal and neighboring characteristics cannot 
ignore the considerable influence of the conflict trap. A state runs a 44% risk of returning to civil 
war up to five years after the cessation of the previous conflict (Collier et al., 2004: 83).  The path-
dependent effects of conflict, and the dynamics that evolved during a war, may lead to differential 
rates of recurrence across risk-prone states (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000). The risk of recurrence has 
been shown to be strongly related to political and economic advancement (Walter, 2004). It stands 
to reason that the political institutions both within and across states are of particular importance in 
creating a stable post-war environment, or alternatively, creating an environment of hostile and 
unstable relations which may exacerbate the already feeble governing institutions in a state.   
However, it is also true that factors affecting the risk of recurrence are different from those 
across all civil wars. The airing of grievances and the cessation of conflict creates new opportunities 
for reinstated or new governments to redress the causes and consequences of the previous conflict. 
A failure to do so is presumed to lead to quick recurrence. Post-conflict third-party intervention is 
often couched in terms of improvements in political participation, as this factor particularly is 
important to post-conflict societies (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000).  The lack of democratic 
institutions, which is generally insignificant in many onset studies, is shown by Walter to powerfully 
predict recurrence (2004: 384). Walter also finds the risk of recurrence is due to growth experienced 
in the interim between the cessation of conflict and the onset of another; should people believe their 
lot is not improving, rebel recruitment prospects improve (2004:372, Elbadawi, 2001, Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2001; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Gates, 2002).  
  If internal political factors essentially make or break the conflict trap, the political 
environment in which a state is operating should have a considerable impact on its ability to hinder 
renewed conflict activity, for two separate reasons: 1) surrounding regime characteristics create a 
context in which neighboring intervention is harmful to continuing peace or where states are unable 
to withstand the negative implications of ‘bad neighborhoods’ due to a weakened postwar state;  
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relatedly 2) “predatory states that seek to take advantage of the internal weaknesses of others” (Lake 
and Rothchild, 1998:5) can capitalize on the post-war weakness of states to encourage or fund a 
renewed rebellion.  
2.6 Hypotheses 
In an effort to build upon the multiple studies discussed above, I will integrate the various 
conclusions reached concerning conflict, regimes, regions and development.  It is clear that regime 
neighborhoods/regions are associated with a particular risk structure for both interstate and 
intrastate conflict. Democratic areas have a positive impact on peace, while autocratic and anocratic 
areas have negative impact on peace. It is unclear whether these relationships consider a singular 
state’s regime type, although democratic regions are found to have a pacifying effect on its member 
states. While democratic states in autocratic regions may be more conflict prone in the short term, 
due to the adaptive diffusion of democracies, democratic values result in long-term peace. But these 
relationships may be dependent on a state’s level of development. The local and regional diffusion 
of democracy has, as Gleditsch (2002, 2003) has shown, a pacifying effect on civil conflict, but only 
at certain levels of income (Hegre, 2003) and only after an initial turbulent period.  Further, 
researchers have separately shown the impact of neighboring wars and characteristics on the risk of 
internal strife, yet how these attributes affect a state’s political stability is unknown.  
I contend the effects of regime type and regime clustering can be further compartmentalized 
beyond broad meso (neighborhood) or macro (regional) levels; neighborhood regime types may 
affect clusters of high and low conflict risk states differently. Further, within high risk states, 
recurrence episodes will be treated separately to both retest Walter’s findings on a larger population 
and determine the influence of surrounding states of the risk of political breakdown and conflict.  
The following are four hypotheses regarding both civil war and regime characteristics.  The 
first reasserts the claim that lagged neighboring war increases the risk of civil conflict within a state. 
The second makes distinctions between the varying influences of neighboring political institutions. 
The third assumes that the relationships specified in hypothesis two should be conditional on 
income. The fourth asserts that neighboring institutions and income should be strongly related to 
civil war recurrence.   
Hypothesis 1:   
As noted, the role of warring neighbors is acknowledged to positively affect civil war onset in a state.  
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However, many well known studies often do not include this variable (e.g. Fearon and Laitin 2003). 
As a departure from other studies, I contend that the effects of neighboring wars differ across states, 
with high risk states experiencing compounding high risk due to neighboring states.  Low risk states 
will experience a corresponding lower risk due to the general absence of
neighboring civil wars. 
Hypothesis 2: Neighborhood (border sharing states) regime characteristics influence the risk of civil 
war within a state.  
  2a) a “democratic” neighborhood will minimize the risk of civil war due to the pacifying 
nature of clustered democracies and the push in democratic states to not associate nor support 
autocratic and warring neighbors, regardless of a state’s regime type. However, democratic states will 
display an additional peace ‘dividend’ over autocratic or anocratic members of democratic 
neighborhoods. 
  2b) an “autocratic” neighborhood will have no discernable effect on the risk of civil war 
onset regardless of a member state’s regime type. There is no ‘autocratic peace’, autocrats may be 
more hostile to each other and generally not regard peace as a goal in neighboring states. 
  2c) an “anocratic” neighborhood will increase the risk of civil war for both anocratic and 
non-anocratic member states. The risk to all regime types may is positive, although anocratic and 
autocratic states may have a compounded risk due to internal political weakness or dissension. 
Externally, weak anocratic neighbors make them unable to coerce neighbors into peaceful behaviour 
or act as a stable intervener. 
Hypothesis 3: Given that Hegre (2003) found that the positive relationship between democracy and 
civil peace is contingent on income levels, it is possible that neighboring influences are also related 
to income.  At higher levels of development, hypothesis #2 holds, yet at low levels of development 
the actions and effectiveness of neighboring democracies should be curtailed. Here, ‘income’ refers 
to the state’s income, not the average of neighboring states.  
  3a) low income states in a democratic neighborhood will have a positive relationship to the 
risk of civil strife due to the inability of low income states to maintain significant control over 
potential rebellion within their borders and beyond. 
  3b) low income states in an autocratic neighborhood should not act in a considerably 
different way toward neighbors from high income autocracies.  
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  3c) anocratic neighborhoods are low income phenomena. Therefore, no discernable impact 
across income levels should be obvious. 
Hypothesis 4: Hypothesis three relates to the ability of neighboring attributes to influence the risk of 
recurrence of conflict within a state.   Because the risk of recurrence is strongly related to political 
factors within a state, the influence of interactions between political entities and their surrounding 
states may be heightened. Interactions across income levels and political institutions should be 
particularly important as they note the propensity of outside interference and domestic stability. 
  4a) All types of regimes within democratic neighborhoods should have a lower conflict risk, 
relative to other regime neighborhoods. Democratic states in democratic regions should have the 
lowest recurrence risk. Although lower income states should have an increased risk compared to 
higher income states. 
  4b) All regimes in autocratic neighborhoods should experience risks higher than those in 
democratic neighborhoods. This effect should be exacerbated by very low income levels. Autocratic 
or anocractic regimes in these neighborhoods should experience the highest risks. 
  4c) All regimes in an anocratic neighborhoods should experience their highest average risk of 
recurrence overall all other neighborhoods. This should be highly conditional on income, leading to 
the highest risks in the lowest income states, and a null effect in higher income states.  
Across all hypotheses, I expect the strength of wars and regime effects to differ across 
countries. Nominally lower risk states may experience a marked decrease in the negative influence 
from neighbors. It is possible that such lower risk states may experience a positive ‘dividend’ from 
neighboring democracy and that the interaction between higher income democracies may create 
another type of democratic peace (in this case, civil peace). 
3.0 Data and Research Design 
Data for this project are based on both country-year data from Fearon and Laitin’s Ethnicity, 
Insurgency and Civil War Project (2003) 1 and the PRIO/Uppsala Armed Conflict Data (P-UACD). 
The data are from 1946 to 2001 in country year format. In total, 161 countries with populations over 
100,000 are included for 6820 country year observations.  
  The hypotheses call for two dependent variables. The first is civil war onset. Fearon and 
Laitin (2003) use a 1000 death threshold in their study while P-UACD has a 25 death threshold for 
                                                 
1 Paper and data available at http://www.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/  
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civil war. With the use of P-UACD data, I increase the number of conflicts accounted for by 28%. 
For the period 1946-2001, 249 onsets are recorded using a two year hiatus from reported fighting to 
define a new onset. These onsets account for 3.6% of the dataset. The recurrence variable is coded 
‘1’ for every subsequent war after the cessation of the first civil war within an independent state. A 
variable for peace years counted the years since the cessation of a conflict, initial or recurrent. There 
are 97 episodes of recurrent conflict in these data, accounting for 1.5% of the total data.   
Approximately 40% of all conflict onsets are recurrent wars. Considerable regional differences in the 
number of recurrent war episodes are apparent (see Table 3.1), but for the eight larger regions 
specified
2, still almost 40% of all civil wars across regions are recurrent. 
  Walter’s (2004) study of recurrence using Correlates of War data found no consistent pattern 
in the timing of renewed war and a median duration of peace at 14 years.  The P-UACD recurrence 
data display two distinct patterns: 1) these data show that the median duration of peace is between 
four to five years.  As Collier et al (2004) note, most conflicts recur within a one to five year period 
after civil war has ended; 2) the most war prone period is between two and three years after initial 
cessation. 
Table 1: Conflict Onsets and Recurrence by Region
3 
Region  
  Onsets (#)  Subsequent Conflict (#)  % of Subsequent Conflicts 
Europe 20  8  40% 
Middle East  27  8  30% 
East Asia  6  2  33% 
South/Central  Asia  37  14  38% 
South East Asia   32  16  43% 
South/Central America  39  14  41% 
Africa 86  34  40% 




                                                 
2 Regions specified include Europe, Middle East, East Asia, Central and South Asia, South East Asia, South and 
Central America, North America, Africa, and Oceania. 
3 North American region not included as it had no conflicts.  
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3.1 Domestic Variables 
The core variables used in this analysis are common throughout civil war onset studies.  POLITY 
scores (from the POLITY dataset4) range from -10 to +10.  In total, 36% of the dataset consists of 
democratic country-years (+5 to +10), 43% of these data are autocratic country years (-5 to -10) and 
20% are anocratic country years (-4.9 to +4.9). GDP data are from the Fearon and Laitin data. This 
variable is logged for analysis.  Low income states are defined as those in the lowest quartile (under 
1000 dollars per year). Moving averages are created for both Polity and logged GDP scores to create 
a smoothed trend surface and reduce the impact of single year outliers. Moving averages control for 
the need to lag particular variables and decrease the bias of large, sudden changes in scores. Values 
were smoothed at three year intervals.     
Ethnic fractionalization data are from Fearon’s Ethnic Fractionalization score (2002)5. This 
score has a high correlation (.75) with the commonly used Ethnic Fractionalization score derived 
from Atlas Narodov Mira (1964). The differences are primarily in the typology of groups, Fearon 
allows for ethno linguistic and cultural groups, whereas the Russian Atlas is based solely on ethno 
linguistic fractionalization. Table 3.2 summarizes the primary state level independent variables (table 
3.2 presented in appendix). 
 
3.2 Neighbor Variables 
Spatial lag variables account for neighboring characteristics. Neighbors are first-order (direct border 
sharing) states and all neighborhood variables are averaged from first order values. Neighboring 
wars are coded positively (1) if a border sharing neighbor is at war (not limited to the year of onset 
but the duration of the neighboring war). This variable is further disaggregated by the size of the 
adjacent war.  If the war intensity is coded as level 3 in the UACD it is considered a large war 
(similar to Fearon and Laitin’s coding of onsets). Any level 2 conflict (more than 25 and less than 
1000 battle deaths over the entire conflict) or a level 1 (25 battle deaths in one year, 1000 battle 
deaths over the course of the conflict)6 are subsumed under the small war category. It is then 
possible to check whether it is the presence or the size of a neighboring conflict is the salient 
attribute.  A total of 2207 country years are coded ‘1’ for the presence of a neighboring war.  When 
                                                 
4 http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/ 
5 http://www.duke.edu/web/licep/6/fearon/fearon.pdf  
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neighboring wars are parsed based on war size, 1603 country years of states have neighbors with a 
small civil war, 1089 country years of states have a neighbor(s) experiencing a large civil war. An 
added total of 2692 neighboring country years is 485 country years higher than the neighboring war 
variable due to the presence of country years in which states had multiple neighbors suffering from 
both small and large wars. Table 3.2 summarizes independent neighboring variables. 
  Neighboring Polity scores are an average of all Polity scores across border sharing states. 
This variable has a median value of -1.5. Democratic, autocratic and anocratic neighborhoods are 
dummy variables based on the average Polity score (consistent coding criteria as used for state 
democracy, autocracy and anocracy scores). In total, 16% of state country years are democratic 
neighbors, 25% are autocratic neighborhoods and 57% are anocratic neighborhoods. The principal 
difference between neighborhood regime scores and state regime scores concerns the averaging of 
neighborhood polities. It does highlight a number of important considerations: fully democratic 
neighborhoods are the least likely phenomena, while anocratic (or mixed regime neighborhoods) 
clearly dominate. From the regressions results, it will be possible to note whether increasingly 
democratic regions or increasingly autocratic regions experienced more conflict. 
Neighboring instability is a dummy variable and positive (1) if the overall average polity 
score moves by one unit (one point) from one year to the next. The degree of change is smaller in 
this instability measure due to the change required to move an average collective neighboring sum 
by one point.  
To test the relationship between development and neighborhood influence, a series of 
interaction terms are created. Democratic neighborhoods are the reference category for the regime 
neighborhood variable. Interactions with income combine the logged GDP measure with regime 
dummy variables. All results must be considered relative to mean income states in democratic 
neighborhoods.   
3.3 Regional Characteristics and Variables 
For both theoretical and empirical reasons, countries are clustered into one of eighteen larger 
regions to test whether regional characteristics have an effect on conflict and political disorder. 
These regions are based on UN definitions of sub-continent regions. A considerable body of work 
                                                                                                                                                             
6 See Strand et al. (2004) at http://www.prio.no/cwp/armedconflict/current/codebook_v3_0.pdf for more details on 
UACD coding practices.  
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has focused on the region as an important political unit as the inclusion of regions can increase the 
information attained from analysis.  Gleditsch (2002) examines the impact of regional institutions on 
both conflict and cooperation. As there is a marked regionalization of civil conflict, he concludes 
that this is a result of dependence and shared influences between geographically proximate entities. 
In turn, geographically determined interaction strongly influences the constraints and opportunities 
available to individual states, such as how states can control the influence of external events.  
  Differing concepts of ‘region’ are apparent within war literature. Varynen (1984) discusses 
how regional definition can depend on economic, political or social constructions and follows that 
war risk differs depending on which regional construction is predominant.  Huntington bases his 
thesis of a Clash of Civilizations on regions defined by religious character; Cohen (1963) bases his 
regions on geopolitical relationships. Cohen’s geopolitical regions are extended throughout the 
world to emphasize the importance of state and regional relationships to global security. His design 
of security is collective in that the local realities are considered part of overall global security.  Rosh’s 
(1988) concept of the security web emphasizes the importance of regional configurations in Third 
World state security.   Security webs are primarily determined by geographical proximity and 
reflexive relationships between military spending and neighbor military spending. Rosh finds that a 
Third World state’s immediate external environment has a significant impact on that country’s 
military burden. Furthermore, Third World states are “uniformly affected by that state’s immediate 
external environment while the particularities of a state’s geographic region serve to shape the 
policies differently (1988: 692). 
Keeping with the guidelines laid out by Thompson in his discussion of regional attributes, 
the foremost criterion for regional relationships is “proximity or primary stress on a geographic 
region” (1973: 93). Furthermore, “whereas analytical boundaries are ultimately arbitrary, some are 
most justified and more useful than others” (1973: 91) and the analyst should select the 
configuration that appears to offer the best understanding of the phenomena being studied. For this 
analysis, regions are based on United Nations definitions of regional subsystems clearly defined by 
the geographical proximity between member countries. This regional configuration is manipulatible 
and surely will result in different outcomes should it be changed, but as the international community 
recognize these regional configurations and states locate themselves within these regions, they are 
germane units of association.  
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4.0 Multi-Level Models  
A brief introduction to the choice of method is necessary. Previous civil war studies have used a 
variety of methods such as Poisson, linear, and logistic regression (Collier, 1999-2001; Fearon and 
Laitin, 2003; Sambanis, 2001). Fearon and Laitin’s use of logistic regression is structured to provide 
probabilities of a positive outcome (e.g. probability that war will occur) yet it is not appropriate for 
time dependent data. Because of the nature of time-series data, observations of countries over time 
are dependent; not accounting for this temporal dependence can bias statistical models.   
  Mixed multilevel models (MML) can be used to explore and predict factors that lead to civil 
war onset and instability. MML models are a variant of multiple regression that allow for both 
random and fixed effects and a hierarchical distribution of variance.  The basic idea of MML models 
is that both individual and group aspects explain the dependent variable (Sniders and Bosker, 1999). 
To ignore clustered relationships (such as pupils in schools, patients in hospitals, and country years 
in countries) risks overlooking the impact and importance of group effects while also potentially 
invalidating many of the traditional statistical techniques used for studying relationships. The basic 
MML model, described in equation 1, is designed around random intercepts. The intercept is able to 
vary throughout the levels producing a deviation of each level. In turn, this deviation is used to 
create the variance accounted for on each level.  The benefits of using multilevel models are: 1) that 
hierarchical frameworks “encourage a systemic analysis of how covariates affect an outcome 
variable”; 2) correct biases in parameter estimates common in clustered data; 3) correct standard 
errors, confidence intervals and significance tests; 4) create decomposed variance and covariance for 
each level (Guo and Zhao, 2000: 444). The assumptions underlying MML models are that the 
variance on each level is higher than zero and the log relative risk follows a normal distribution 
(Langford et al. 1999). 
  For this model, observations are clustered into three levels. The level one units are country-
years (e.g. each year from 1945-2001 in France, Mali from 1960-2001, etc).  Each country-year is 





Equation 1: Multilevel Model with a Random Intercept- Three levels 
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                     is the dependent variable- a function of both individual and group aspects (Sniders 
and Bosker, 1999: 39).   is the intercept for this model.  A basic multilevel model allows the 
intercept to be random. In that case,   would represent the grand mean intercept.   is the 
independent variable (such as GDP) and its effects on levels 1, 2, and 3 (  respectively).    is 
the unmodeled variability on level 2, and  is the unmodeled variability on level three. These 
parameters exist for all higher levels (2, 3, …n) and record the level deviation from the grand mean 
(Guo and Zing, 2000, 445).   represents the addition of the grand intercept and the 
level 2 unit’s deviation from it.   represents the level 3 unit deviations plus the 
intercept. Without    and  , this would be a standard regression model.  Together, these error 
terms make up a three level model, with three sources of deviation (e, u, & v). 
  Multilevel models for binary data are similar to the models above except for the outcome 
variable.  Due to the nature of dichotomous outcomes, the probability of a positive response “1” is 
equal to  . Using the GLM logit link function, the multilevel random intercept 
equation transforms into a logistic three level regression (Guo and Zhao, 2000: 446) where the 
outcome  is now a logistic term  .  has an expected mean of zero and 
variance of  ;   has an expected mean on 0 and a variance of  . 
  A central benefit to using MML models is the ability to access level deviations. It is possible 
to calculate the proportion of variance explained by each level, also called an Intraclass Correlation 
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Coefficient (ICC).  This is the basic measure for the degree of dependence between observations 
and the proportion of variance accounted for by the group level, or the covariance of error terms 
inside a cluster.  This proportional variance is found for higher levels (2, 3…n) by dividing the 
variance explained on level x by the sum of all levels of variance in the model.  A percentage of 
variance explained by each level is found by multiplying this result by 100. This percentage tells how 
much of the variance found in the dependent variable is due to the differences between higher units 
(Boardman, 2003).  A high variance explained on the state level would imply that states differ 
significantly on their observations of the dependent variable; a low variance explained would imply 
that states are similar in how the causal variables affect the onset of civil war. A high variance 
explained on level three would imply that the effects of the independent variables upon the 
dependent differ over regions; therefore, heterogeneity exists among regions. A low variance 
explained implies that differences in regional variance based on independent variables are similar. 
With the addition of state or regional variables (e.g. a regional ethnic fragmentation score) we can 
note whether the corresponding level variance decreases.  For example, an ICC of .10 would imply 
that 90% of variance across level 2 (ex. classes) observations of the dependent variable is due to level 
one (ex. students), while 10% is due to class differences. 
Equation 4.2: Estimating Intraclass Correlation Coefficients 
      
= Variance due to the clustering variable / (variance due to the clustering variable + variance for all other levels). 
For rare events data (used for civil war onset models),   is the equation that 
estimates the level one logistic distribution (representing the variance on level one).  For 
a standard logistic distribution (used for Uppsala/PRIO civil war onset models) 
 is the equation to estimate the intra-class correlation coefficient and 
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 Equation 4.3: Multilevel Model with Random slopes and Binary Outcome- Three Levels 
      
 
The MML models with random coefficients are also known as the ‘random slopes’ models. 
Each random coefficient can vary over all levels to produce a unique variance for each unit. 
Therefore,   and  represent the level two varying intercept and level two varying slope, 
respectively.    is recorded for each level two unit as the unique deviation of the slope 
from the overall mean of the slope.  The interpretation for higher-level units is the same. A 
covariance term is also created to indicate the effect of a varying coefficient on already high-
risk categories. 
5.0 Interpretation of Regression Results 
5.1 Civil War 
Whether multilevel models are an appropriate choice for the data is determined by an empty model 
(see Table 2). In this case, an empty model for onset shows a significant variance across second level 
observations (countries). If regions remain significant with the inclusion of independent variables we 
can conclude that 1) conflicts do cluster regionally regardless of similar controls; and 2) the regions 
chosen for this project are acceptable. Regions were not significant once neighboring attributes were 
added to models of civil war onset and recurrence, and therefore are excluded from further analysis. 
An empty model for recurrence shows considerable variation on the country level, but not the 
regional. This translates to mean that both all episodes of civil war and recurrent episodes have a 
particular geography in which they appear cluster over space and time. However, the empty models 
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Table 2: Empty Models for Dependent Variables 
Dependent Variable  Constant St.  Error  Log 
Likelihood 
Variance at level 2
∗  Variance at level 3* 
Civil War Onset  -3.67  .123  -1028  .988 (.215)   
  -3.85  .191  -1021  .669 (.186)  .525 (.239) 
Recurrent Civil war  -4.79  .213  -494  1.17 (.413)   
  -4.80  .235  -494  .940 (.384)  .177 (.224) 
∗ standard errors are reported in parenthesis 
Table 3 compares the effects of the spatial lag conflict variables, specifically of neighboring war size 
on domestic civil war risk. Although bivariate regressions are presented in Table 3, it fully supports 
the hypothesis that neighboring wars exert a positive effect on the risk on domestic civil war inside a 
state. Further, the variance at level 2 imply those risks are experienced differently across countries as 
some experience an additional risk due to persistently warring neighbors, and other have a positive 
effect due to peaceful neighbors. 
Table 3: Neighboring War Effects on Domestic Civil War Risk 
Civil War Onset  Constant  Coefficient  St. Error  Log Likelihood  Variance at level 2 
Large Wars  -3.73  .306*** 0.182  -1027.3  1.04  (.24) 
Small Wars  -3.83  .562*** 0.16  -1022.81  1.03  (.24) 
All  Wars -3.93 .668***  0.159 -1020.18  1.03  (.24) 
 
  Results for civil war onset (Table 3-model 1) reinforce previous assertions made within the 
literature.  Counter to a number of studies, when Polity scores are transformed into a moving 
average, the salience of the score decreases and both Polity and its squared term are insignificant. 
This may be related to the nature of moving averages—the sudden peaks or lulls in scores will not 
exert undue influence when averaged over time (in this case, 3 years).  Neighboring wars, instability, 
increased ethnic fractionalization, national population, oil dependence, and rough terrain all foster 
an environment for civil war. Specifically, the presence of a neighboring war increases the risk of 
internal conflict by 39%.  Increased income is the sole negative influence on the risk of civil war 
within a state. The intraclass correlation coefficient for model 2 (Table 4) is .335—9% of the 
variance in civil wars is attributed to the country level (unmodeled variance). It can be understood as 
the percent of unexplained variation that is unique to states (Boardman and Saint Onge, 2004):  91% 
of the variance in civil war onset occurs between country-years, while 9% of the total variation  
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occurs across states.  While in empty models, the ICC was considerably larger across states, it 
changes precipitously in some cases when independent variables are added. The ICC is each state’s 
additional variance as computed by this specific model, or the change from the grand mean 
associated with each state.  Increased or decreased variance is partially determined by individual risk. 
Those countries with increased variance were overwhelmingly low income, high risk countries. Such 
countries experience a higher risk of civil war and have neighbors at a higher risk. These states 
experience ‘double jeopardy’, particularly if a neighbor is actually at war. However, those states with 
a decreased variance are safer both due to internal characteristics and peaceful neighbors. They, in 
effect, have a peace dividend. 
  It is also clear (Table 5.3-model 2) that neighboring polities (as general Polity scores) do not 
foster an environment of civil war. When individual regime neighborhoods are tested, a more 
complex picture emerges (Table 4-models 3 and 4).  Both autocratic and anocratic neighborhoods 
are significantly and positively associated with an increased risk of civil war. States surrounded by 
autocratic states are three times more likely to have a civil war over states in democratic 
neighborhoods. In anocratic neighborhoods, the risk of civil strife increases by a factor of 2.5 
compared to odds ratios in a democratic neighborhood (see Table 4-model 3). More importantly, 
these regime neighborhoods alter the impact of GDP. When surrounded by democratic states, the 
effect of income on civil war onset is stable or flat; increasing income does not significantly alter the 
risk of civil war. In anocratic neighborhoods, increasing income has a significantly stronger role in 
lessening the risk of civil war.  For a one unit increase in logged GDP, the risk of onset decreases by 
34%. The effect of increasing income in autocracies is slightly weaker, at a 33% decrease in risk (see 








Table 4: Neighboring Wars and Conflict Risk 
Variables Model  1 
Level 2 N :6820 
Level 3 N: 161 
-2ll: -983 
Dep Var: Onset 
Model 2 
Level 2 N:6820 
Level 3 N: 161 
-2ll: -983 
Dep Var: Onset 
Model 3 
Level 2 N:6820 
Level 3 N: 161 
-2ll: -974 
Dep Var: Onset 
Model 4 
Level 2 N:6820 
Level 3 N: 161 
-2LL: -967 
Dep Var: Onset 
All Neigh. 
Wars 
 .403(.154)***   .417(.155)***   .365(.152)** 
 
.337(.152)** 
LGDP -.283(.124)**  -.246(.127)**   .053(.150) .085(.139) 
Lpop   .208(.06)***   .214(.06)***   .213(.057)***  .231(.058)***  
Polity   .013(.015)  .025(.017)   .053(.150)  
Polity(2) -.000(.003)  -.000(.003) -.002(.003)   
Instability    .906(.158)***   .898(.158)   .780(.160)*** .689(.163)*** 
Autocracy      -.039(.214) 
Anocracy      .509(.213)** 
Terrain   .152(.068)**   .157(.069)**   .132(.064)** .122(.064)* 
Oil   .47(.222)**   .456(.224)**   .540(.231)** .454(.232)** 
Eth. Frac  1.29(.35)*** 1.27(.349)***    1.04(.343)*** 1.00(.22)** 
Neighbor 
Polity 
 -.031(.022)     
Neighbor 
Polity (2) 
   .001(.003)     
Neigh_Auto    1.04(.386)** .852(.382)** 
Neigh_Ano    .908(.018)** .708(.355)** 
N_Auto* 
GDP 
  -.446(.173)** -.443(.174)** 
N_Ano* 
GDP 
  -.432(.127)** -.409(.128)*** 
Constant  -6.58 -6.73 -6.47  -7.40 
  Variance Score & %  Variance Score & %  Variance Score & %  Variance Score & % 
Level Two  .3357(9%)  .3385 (9%)  .240 (6%)  .238 (6%) 
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Figure 1: Risk Assessments by Neighborhood Regime Type & GDP7 






































  Model 4 demonstrates that the political character of states interacts differently with 
surrounding regions. Anocratic states in a democratic region have a significantly higher risk of civil 
war than democratic states in democratic regions. However, civil war risk in all states is heightened 
by belonging to an autocratic or anocratic region. Again, these interactive regional relationships alter 
the effect of GDP. Across three regime types (democratic, autocratic, and anocractic), the following 
patterns are clear: 1) civil war risk within democratic neighborhoods’ hovers between 2-4% across all 
regime types (see Figures 2-4). This does not vary significantly across income, indicating that 
democratic neighborhoods have a peaceful effect on member states, regardless of domestic  politics; 
2) the slopes of war risk at increasing levels of income is similar across autocratic and anocratic 
neighborhoods, but the proportional decrease is significantly higher in anocratic neighborhoods, 3) 
anocratic states and regions are the most conflict prone,  and anocratic states in anocratic regions 
                                                 
7 These estimates for risk assessments by regime neighborhood were created by Clarify (Thoms, Wittenberg & 
King, 2005) (see http://gking.harvard.edu/clarify/docs/clarify.html). Clarify does not create estimates with 
GLLAMM models, so these risks are based on logit models. Smaller differences remain, but the general trends are 
quite similar.  
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have the highest average risk rate across all states.
8 The variance associated with regime 
neighborhoods and income level decreases the variance explained across states from 9% to 6%. 
  Figure 2 details conflict risk trajectories in democratic states. At low levels of income in 
unstable neighborhoods, the additional risk to democratic states is higher than that of an autocratic 
state in a democratic region; although the risks are quite similar (see Figure 3).  At the median level 
of income, the impact of regime neighborhood converges. 
Figure 2: Conflict Risk in Democratic States across Regime Neighborhoods 
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  Figure 3 displays conflict risk trajectories in autocratic states. Although the risk across 
neighborhood does converge at the same position in both democratic and anocratic states, 







                                                 
8 Individual trajectories are based on model 4, with changes made for the clarify program. For each figure, the 
estimation is based on varying income, regime and regional type, a neighboring war, and all other variables at their 
mean.  
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Figure 3 Conflict Risk in Autocratic States across Regime Neighborhoods 
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  Figure 4 presents the highest conflict risk category of anocratic states across regions. 
Although, other types of states also have their highest risks in anocratic regions. Again, there is a 
general convergence at the income scale’s mid point (1.2-1.6). If incomes are doubled from the 
lowest point, the risk of conflict is halved.  
Figure 4 Conflict Risk in Anocratic States across Regime Neighborhoods 
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In empty multilevel models of instability, 41% of the natural variability of recurrence is due to 
variation between states. Basic logit models for this sample disqualified a number of independent 
variables found significant in models for all civil wars. These effects are confirmed by Multilevel 
models; domestically, only instability, population, ethnic fractionalization, and anocracy are 
positively and significantly related to conflict recurrence (see Table 5). Neighboring anocracies and 
income interacted with autocratic neighborhoods are weakly related to higher risks of civil conflict at 
particular income points. Overall, these models are not particularly good predictors of civil war 
recurrence. Since recurrence is approximately 40% of all civil wars in the sample, models 1-4 are 
perhaps only explaining correlates to a portion of all wars.  
  There is a remaining 13%-17% of unexplained country level heterogeneity across models 5-
7. States differ significantly in their recurrence risk determinants. Models 5-7 are also run controlling 
for select regions (Africa, South Asia, etc); these controls are highly insignificant. Because the model 
is a poor fit, and considerable heterogeneity, figures such as those for the models 1-4 do not display 
significant differences across regime neighborhoods. 
Table 5: Recurrence Models 
Variables Model  5 
Level 1 N:6820 
Level 2 N: 161 
-2ll: -465 
Dep Var: Recur 
Model 6 
Level 1 N:6820 
Level 2 N: 161 
-2ll: -461 
Dep Var: Recur 
Model 7 
Level 1 N:6820 
Level 2 N: 161 
-2ll: -459 
Dep Var: Recur 
All Neigh.Wars   .345(.238) .309(.235)  .292(.233) 
Instability 1.00(.234)***  .961(.236)***  .852(.239)*** 
LGDP -.117(.192)  .141(.238) .068(.22) 
Lpop   .273(.083)***  .257(.081)*** .267(.081)*** 
Terrain   .077(.096)  .060(.093) .052(.092) 
Oil .362(.318)  .526(.321) .495(.318) 
Eth. Frac   1.55(.507)** 1.43(.501)**  1.34(.494)** 
Polity -.0013(.026) -.0125(.025)   
Polity(2) -.0044(.0055) -.004(.005)   
Autocracy     .080(.333)  
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Variables Model  5 
Level 1 N:6820 
Level 2 N: 161 
-2ll: -465 
Dep Var: Recur 
Model 6 
Level 1 N:6820 
Level 2 N: 161 
-2ll: -461 
Dep Var: Recur 
Model 7 
Level 1 N:6820 
Level 2 N: 161 
-2ll: -459 
Dep Var: Recur 
Anocracy     .607(.325)* 
Neighbor 
Polity 
-.0093(.036)    
Neighbor 
Polity (2) 
-.006(.005)    
Neigh_Auto   .373(.653) .398(.648) 
Neigh_Ano   .980(.580)* .911(.583) 
N_Auto* 
GDP 
 -.623(.319)*  -.601(.324)* 
N_Ano* 
GDP 
 -.264(.187)  -.226(.186) 
Constant -7.96  -8.614  -8.96 
 Variance  Score  & 
% 
Variance Score & 
 % 
Variance Score &  
% 
Level Two  .337 (17%)  .266 (14%)  .237 (13%) 
  
 
Hypothesis one is clearly upheld. Neighboring civil wars do foster an environment of increased risk 
for civil conflict within a state. This holds across war size, although surprisingly, smaller wars have a 
stronger influence, possibly due to the increased number of smaller wars. Hypotheses two and three 
are supported. Different neighborhoods have strikingly different conflict trajectories. In addition, 
interactions between individual states and regions alter conflict trajectories across income levels. The 
influences of neighborhood political institutions are contingent upon a state’s development level, 
and vice versa, the influence of income is related to the surrounding political context. Democratic 
neighborhoods have a stabilizing influence; the effects of democracy at any level of income are flat 
and discourage civil war within a state. The creation of such neighborhoods ensures that income 
level of a state is no longer the dominant factor in civil war onset. Autocratic and anocratic 
neighborhoods do increase the risk of civil war onset within a state; this risk is significantly mitigated 




  With regard to recurrence, the models specified here found domestic determinants, such as 
population and instability are very critical to states in a post-war environment. However, neither 
domestic nor surrounding polity scores for states are found to influence risk. When distinguished by 
regime type, only anocratic states have almost three times the risk of returning to war than a 
democratic state (which is extremely low). Income does influence the effect of recurrence in 
autocratic neighborhoods, but again the additional risk is quite small. Overall, hypothesis four is only 
partially accepted; it certainly does not display the regime neighborhood variation evident in the total 
civil war sample. 
 
6.0 Discussion 
The aim of this paper is to first identity the effects of neighboring regimes and neighboring wars on 
domestic civil war risk and conflict recurrence, and second to detect characteristics of states which 
are particularly affected by their neighbors. In relation to the first, neighboring wars do increase the 
risk of civil war within states with an average risk increase of 39%. This risk is dependent on the 
political milieu of the state at hand. Domestic characteristics can moderate the increased risk from 
neighbors, particularly increasing income levels. However, regional characteristics can moderate 
domestic characteristics, especially democratic regional effects. If a state is surrounded by stable, 
developed democracies the risk of conflict, regardless of income, never increases past 4%. The risk 
profiles for all states in autocratic or anocratic regions are highly dependent on income level.  Hence, 
neighboring regimes types do alter the context within which domestic upset occurs. Their effects are 
conditional on development levels, yet the analysis clearly pointed to the effects exceptionally risk 
prone anocratic, or mixed regime, neighborhoods have on domestic regime stability. 
  This conclusion is certainly not as strong with regard to conflict recurrence, where the model 
found weak support that democratic regions are more stable and anocratic neighborhoods less so. 
However, the risk profiles were extremely low due to the model specifications. Neither the political 
character of the state surrounding regions does not, at this time, appear to strongly affect the risk of 
conflict recurrence.  
  With regard to the second point, differences in internal and neighborhood characteristics of 
states explain almost one sixth of the global variance in recurrence rates, and between 6-9% of the  
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variance in civil war onset across states. This reinforces both the well established importance of 
country year characteristics and the often unnoted importance of states as distinct units of analysis. 
  It is clear from this study that neighborhoods matter; neighboring wars contribute 
considerable risk to civil war onset and neighborhood political attributes can mitigate or add to the 
risk, although this relationship is contingent upon income level in all but democratic neighborhoods. 
That income is more important in particular political surroundings is a unique finding of this study. 
Such a conclusion contributes to understanding the traps that low income states are in—a poverty 
trap, as elaborated by Jeffrey Sachs (2005), but also a related political trap.  The overwhelming 
negative influence of political disorder may be as important in limiting the economic opportunities 
available to unstable states.   
  Such traps, whether economic or political, are phenomena of already weak states. It is clear 
from the results presented here that states most prone to civil wars are also most prone to being 
adversely influenced by their neighbors. The diffusion of political disorder and civil wars creates a 
‘double jeopardy’ situation. These disparities across states are not due to variance in economic, 
political or social situation controlled for in the models presented here, but different positive or 
adverse patterns of regional influence.   
  In the most recent iteration of Marshall and Gurr’s State failure project, they identify ten 
‘neighborhoods’ of political relevance (see http://members.aol.com/cspmgm/conflict.htm). They 
also find that democracy is increasing over time relative to autocracy. Democracy and autocracy 
have inverse relationships to each other which seem to be separate from anocratic trends. As global 
democracy is rising this should, by all accounts, lead to more inter-state and intra-state peace. 
Although new and transitional democratic internal peace is unstable, functioning democracies are 
more peaceful internally and externally. Research presented here is unique in its contribution 
regarding how regime type as a significant development indicator, which in turn is salient in 
determining the risk of civil war across states.  This paper contributes to a growing body of literature 
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables 
Variable  Observations  Mean  Std. Dev  Min   Max 
Summary Statistics of State Core Variables 
Log GDP  6818  0.7685  0.854  -2.8785  4.2 
Log Pop  6820  9.073  1.452  5.4  14.055 
Polity 6818  -0.3143  6.257  -10  10 
Polity2 6818  56.17  24.59  0  100 
Rough Terr.  6820  2.172  1.45  0  4.55 
Oil 6820  0.13  0.337  0  1 
Instability 6820  0.126  0.332  0  1 
Ethnic Frac  6820  0.46  0.269  0.00199  1 
Uppsala Onset  6820  0.036  0.188  0  1 
          
Summary Statistics of Neighboring and Neighborhood Core Variables 
Neighbor_Wars 6820      0  1 
Big War  6820  0.1596  0.36  0  1 
Small War  6820  0.235  0.424  0  1 
Neigh_Demo 6820  0.1587  0.336  0  1 
Neigh_Auto 6820  0.259  0.438  0  1 
Neigh_Ano 6820  0.5818  0.493  0  1 
Neigh_Instabi 6820 0.361  0.48  0  1 
Ano_Income 3820  0.3822 0.79 -2.407  2.966 
Auto_Income 3820 0.1141  0.58  -3.036  4.2 
          
 
 
 